We analyze the migrant smuggling market where smugglers di¤er in their capacities to exploit their clients' labor in the destination.
Introduction
This paper presents an analytical model of the migrant smuggling market where smugglers are heterogeneous in terms of the capacity to exploit smuggled migrant labor. We examine the equilibrium number of participants and the equilibrium average exploitation of migrant labor in the market under the assumption that the exploitation capacity is private information. We then conduct comparative statics to investigate the impact of anti-illegal migration measures on the equilibrium. This work thus attempts to highlight a potential link between the …ght against assisted clandestine migration and the incidence of the abuse of illegal migrants.
There has been little analysis of the migrant smuggling market in economics so far, even though smuggling and tra¢ cking in migrants 1 have re- 1 The terms, smuggling and tra¢ cking, have been used interchangeably by some researchers and practioners but with clear distinction by others. A lack of consensus on the use of the terms complicates the analysis of these activities. For instance, Salt and Hogarth discuss this problem in Laczko and Thompson (2000: 18-23) . However, recent effort to create legal instruments to …ght against human smuggling and tra¢ cking has given a clear distinction between these activities. In December 1998, the General Assembly of the United Nations established an ad hoc committee for the purpose of setting up its Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and supplementing protocols speci…c to human smuggling and tra¢ cking. As a result, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants (UN, 2000b) entered into force on 28 January 2004, while the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Tra¢ cking in Persons (UN, 2000a) did so earlier on the Christmas day of 2003. In this paper, we closely follow these two protocols. Appendix 1 provides the relevant excerpts from these UN protocols. Our working de…nitions are that a smuggler (or non-exploitative smuggler) is an agent who provides illegal border crossing services without exploiting its clients in the post-smuggling period, while a traf…cker (or exploitative smuggler) is an agent who also provides the same border crossing services but with exploitation of its clients after successful smuggling. Whether exploitation of migrants is involved or not is often taken as a distinguishing criterion between tra¢ cking and smuggling, eg, Kelly and Regan (2000: 3) , Salt (2000: 33-4) and Interpol (www.interpol.int). We de…ne exploitation as that of labor of a smuggled client, and we ignore for the sake of economic analysis elements of intimidation and violence that seem often involved in both tra¢ cking and smuggling. These working de…nitions of ours will become clear when we describe our analytical framework in Section 3.
cently become one of the major international concerns.
2 Friebel and Guriev (2006) theoretically examined the interaction between migrants and smuggling agents. In their model, not all potential migrants are able to pay for smuggling services upfront. A worker may therefore enter into a debt contract with a smuggler if migrating and must then pay back the debt through work in the destination. Their analysis shows, while stricter border enforcement discourages both …nancially constrained and unconstrained workers to migrate illegally, better detection in the formal employment sector not only discourages the illegal entry of the latter type but encourages that of the former, biasing the composition of illegal immigrants towards the poorer end.
In their model, while smugglers face a risk that migrants may default debt repayments, migrants do not face a risk of being exploited by their smugglers.
3 Dessy and Pallage (2006) theoretically argue the risk of child tra¢ cking serves as a deterrent to parents who send their children to labor markets.
The e¤ort to reduce the incidence of child tra¢ cking therefore increases the parental supply of child labor. Their analysis concentrates on the household utility maximization with respect to the supply of child labor, and tra¢ ckers are not modeled explicitly. Dessy, Mbiekop and Pallage (2005) present 2 For instance, a recent report by the Global Commission on International Migration (2005) touches on the related problems throughout the text. At the same time, its acknowledgment section on page 88 indicates that economists'contributions to the report were scarce.
3 Guzman, Haslag and Orrenius (2002) model migrant smuggling explicitly, but their analysis in a two-country dynamic general equilibrium framework treats smugglers as suppliers of cost-saving border crossing services, and migrants do not face a risk of exploitation. It belongs to the theoretical macroeconomic literature on illegal immigration and border enforcement that began with Ethier (1986), Djajić (1987) and Bond and Chen (1987) but does not attempt to provide microeconomic analysis of interactions between migrants and smugglers. a general equilibrium model with producers who choose between the legal sector and child tra¢ cking. 4 They emphasize the importance of demand for tra¢ cked children in in ‡uencing the incidence of child tra¢ cking. These two studies address the issue of abuse, but children are treated as commodities and do not make any decision. Hence these do not cover the problem we examine in this paper.
In the migrant smuggling market, there is no legally enforceable contract between the providers and the consumers of the illicit services. Therefore, migrants can neither ensure no exploitation nor compensation in the case of exploitation. In addition, as explained in the next section, the consumption of smuggling services requires a loss of the consumers'control over the assets they carry with them-their bodies and labor-once the provision of smuggling services is implemented. Smuggled migrants are thus vulnerable to the abuse by smugglers.
In our model, each smuggler's decision on whether it exploits its clients after successful smuggling is endogenous in the workers' expectation of exploitation in the destination, and a weakened position of a migrant vis-a-vis the smuggler does not necessarily result in exploitation. 5 We assume smugglers exogenously di¤er in their capacities to exploit their clients in the destination and make two decisions at a given smuggling fee: enter the market or not, and exploit or not if smuggling. The exploitation decision depends on the workers'expectation of exploitation in the destination which determines 4 They model a small open source country in the sense that the price per child sold abroad is exogenously given.
5 This paper thus provides a solution to one of Väyrynen's (2003: 3) criticisms about economic approaches to migrant smuggling, ie, inadequate attention paid to exploitative aspects. the smuggling fee. Note that the way we endogenise the quality of a smuggling service is di¤erent from Kim's (1985) adaptation of Akerlof (1970) . In his model, the quality of a secondhand car depends on the level of maintenance by the owner, and car owners exogenously di¤er in their marginal utility gains from the car quality. A car owner chooses the level of maintenance and also decides whether she/he sells or keeps the car. In this paper, the exploitation decision of a smuggler depends on the fee that cannot be chosen by the smuggler when exploitation capacities are private information.
We …nd, when workers cannot distinguish between heterogeneous smugglers, the equilibrium may be characterized by adverse selection: only exploitative smugglers provide border crossing services even though workers are willing to pay a higher fee to hire non-exploitative smugglers. In such a case, we show that policies that reduce the number of active smuggling agents inevitably raise the mean exploitation in the market. Policymakers would then face a dilemma of whether to improve the welfare of smuggled migrants or to diminish the availability of smuggling services.
We also …nd that when the equilibrium is not characterized by adverse selection, di¤erent policy instruments have di¤erent e¤ects on the number of active smuggling agents and the mean exploitation. We will discuss a possibility that di¤erent e¤ects may o¤set each other, making the instruments appear ine¤ective.
In Section 2, we gather stylized facts about the migrant smuggling market from descriptive, non-economic studies. The reason for this section is that there has been little work on this topic in economics. However, readers who are familiar with stylized facts about this market can skip this section. Section 3 presents a benchmark model where information is symmetric between smugglers and migrants. In Section 4, we assume di¤erent exploitation capacities are private information and characterize the market equilibrium.
Section 5 investigates the impact of anti-illegal migration measures on the equilibrium number of participants and the equilibrium average exploitation.
Section 6 concludes with policy implications.
Stylized facts
Several non-economic studies have made crude estimates of the scales of smuggling and tra¢ cking in migrants, based on apprehension data, court cases, survey questionnaires, interviews and best guesses. Salt (2003 : Table   20 ) gathers and compares such estimated …gures and suggests the annual total number of either smuggled or tra¢ cked migrants is approximately 4 million in the world in the second half of the 1990s. According to the US government (USDS, 2004: 23) , approximately 600,000 to 800,000 persons were tra¢ cked across international borders worldwide in 2003. Although these …gures are not comparable, the incidence of tra¢ cking appears to be lower than that of smuggling.
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This section does not provide a thorough collection of stylized facts about migrant smuggling and tra¢ cking but only a selection of them that are relevant to our analysis.
7 Note, while increasingly available surveys of smuggled 6 We should remain skeptical of these estimates, for the nature of both smuggling and tra¢ cking in migrants is clandestine. However, the UK government (IND, 2001: 75) also expressed the same view that tra¢ cking takes place less frequently than smuggling, concerning illegal immigration in the country. See also IOM (2002a) for Armenia and Budapest Group (1999: 15 Europe (CTRCP, 2003) . 9 In Azerbaijan, Bickley (2001: 27) found the same, but IOM (2002b: 16-7, 21) suggests both push and pull factors in ‡uence an individual's migration decision simultaneously. This is natural because, if economic prospects are not thought to be any better overseas than at home, Thompson (2000) . 8 Noneconomic reasons include civil wars, ethnic con ‡icts, political prosecutions, family/relationship problems at home, family reunions and desires for adventure.
9 See also IOM (1996).
there would not be an incentive to leave his/her country. However, there also seem to be those whose migration decisions are in ‡uenced purely by the economic pull. Pieke (2002: 32) and Chin (1999 : 14, referred by Skeldon, 2000b found such individuals are more common in China. L¼ az¼ aroiu and Alexandru (2003: 34-7) found females with higher aspiration are more vulnerable to tra¢ cking in Romania, suggesting the economic pull is important.
In this paper, we take a traditional economic approach to migration decision making and assume the migration decision positively depends on the income gap between the origin and the destination. More speci…cally, we assume each worker can earn zero income at home, ie, no employment prospect at home, while she/he is employed with certainty at the destination.
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Demand for smuggling services A number of authors have argued restrictive immigration policies of destination countries increase the number of migrants who choose to resort to clandestine border crossing and smugglers who can organize it, eg, Ghosh (1998 : 148), Budapest Group (1999 ), Schloenhardt (1999: 212) , Kelly and Regan (2000: 5) , Skeldon (2000a) , Andreas in Kyle and Koslowski (2001: 116) , Cornelius (2001: 668) , Marshall (2001) , ILO (2002: 4) , Gallagher (2002: 28) , Taran and Chammartin (2003: 5-6) , Väyrynen (2003: 3) and NCIS (2003: 37) , although there is no …rm statistical evidence to prove this.
11 Futo and Jundl (2004: 78, 151-2, 10 Accordingly, we will focus on migrants whose decisions are a¤ected by both push and pull factors. Our analysis can be generalized by introducing a range of income levels at home among potential migrants.
11 Donato, Durand and Massey (1992: 153) found weak evidence with a small sample, while Singer and Massey (1997: Koser's (2000: 102-3) survey found some asylum seekers in the sample turning to smugglers because of restrictive policies against them. 12, 13 However, a host country's government is unlikely to take a tolerant immigration policy because, while it may reduce the dependence of irregular migrants on smuggling agents and their vulnerability to tra¢ ckers, the number of illegal immigrants is likely to increase. For instance, according to the European Commission (2004: 9), the Belgian regularization program of 1999 that allowed illegal residents in the country to submit asylum applications seem to have encouraged illegal immigration subsequently.
In this paper, we simply assume individuals need to hire smugglers if they wish to migrate. We thus assume the host country has restrictive immigration policies so that migrating individuals cannot enter the destination legitimately. Our analysis is limited in the sense that migrants do not choose between illegal entries by themselves and entires arranged by smugglers. Gathmann (2004: Table 6b) found the direct e¤ect of strengthened border enforcement on the demand for a smuggler is little.
12 See Morrison and Crosland (2001: 27-39) who explain the restrictive nature of European immigration policies against asylum seekers.
13 Another reason to hire a smuggler might be cost minimisation. Skeldon (2000a: 9-10) speculates that the use of smuggling services is often less costly than that of o¢ cial channels because the latter involves a signi…cant amount of time and bribes. However, bribery is rife in the process of both smuggling and tra¢ cking, and hence its costs are likely to be included in smuggling fees.
Charges for smuggling services Charges for smuggling services as well as payment methods vary widely, and known …gures and methods are based on individual cases. Therefore, we do not list these here. 14 However, there appears to be a common observation in this market. Namely, nonexploitative smugglers charge their clients for border crossing services, while tra¢ ckers may or may not explicitly charge their prey for smuggling. 15 For instance, an IOM study of tra¢ cked women in Belgium found, while most of them did not have to pay a fee to the tra¢ ckers, they found themselves indebted on arrival.
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Provided the exploitation of smuggled persons at the destination is su¢ -ciently pro…table, it is understandable that some tra¢ ckers need not charge them for border crossing. In addition, tra¢ ckers are better o¤ pretending they are non-exploitative if migrants are capable of paying for smuggling services. In our model, tra¢ ckers can mimic the fee chargeable by nonexploitative smugglers because the shut-down fee is lower for the former than the latter. 17 In other words, signalling is not available for the latter under asymmetric information.
We assume migrants pay the smuggling fee only after successful border crossing. Since there are cases where migrants must pay the smuggling fee 14 IOM (2003 : Table 17 .21) lists ranges of smuggling fees by origin and destination. See also Ghosh (1998: 31-2) .
15 Tra¢ ckers make an excuse when exploiting smuggled migrants that they became heavily indebted while being smuggled, so they charge for smuggling implicitly through exploitation. In this paper, we concentrate on commercial smugglers and do not deal with non-exploitative smugglers who do not charge migrants at all. An example is someone who assists an asylum seeker to cross a border on a humanitarian basis. 16 Referred by Ghosh (1998: 22) 17 A smuggler's shut-down fee is the fee at or below which it does not supply a smuggling service and becomes inactive in the market.
upfront, or where they pay it by instalments, our analysis is not comprehensive. In our model, migrants are rational: paying the fee upfront could give a smuggler an incentive to default on the provision of border crossing services, and the migrants should therefore condition the fee payment on successful smuggling. According to Donato, Durand and Massey (1992: 151) for Mexico, Içduygu and Toktas (2002: 38-9) for the Middle East and Futo and Jandl (2004: 18) for Central and Eastern Europe, it is not uncommon that the fee payment is made only after the client is smuggled as promised.
We also assume migrants are able to pay for the fee without being indebted to smugglers. Hence we do not examine the case where a migrant enters a debt contract with a smuggler. The bookkeeping showed the number of clients was about 1,000 per month, which implies the monthly revenue of 200,000 markaa to the pimps. The estimated pro…t to the criminal group after deducting the costs of running the business was at least 100,000 markaa per month, ie, almost 17,000 euros.
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Smugglers who are not employers of their clients can still exploit the migrants simply by selling them. Home O¢ ce (2004: 77) for example reports that the price of a Thai female sold to brothel organizers operating in the United Kingdom was 6,000 pounds sterling in the case uncovered by Operation Horsley. 21 The money paid to the smugglers seem to become debts that the females are forced to repay. In such a case, they receive little money from their work, eg, Hughes (2000: 633-4 33-4).
Benchmark
We now set up a two-country model with a …xed number of identical workers and a …xed number of heterogeneous smugglers. All the workers legally reside in one of the two countries, and we call it the home. The other country is called the destination to which they may attempt to migrate. Economic prospects for the workers are better in the destination than in the home in the sense that the exogenously given earnings per unit of labor are higher in the former than in the latter.
We assume that a worker has no means to migrate from the home to the destination except hiring a smuggler. A smuggler is capable of delivering such a worker from the home to the destination. Migrants would pay for smuggling services only if border crossing were successful. With this payment method, a smuggler cannot have an incentive to default on the provision of smuggling services after receiving a fee, though it does not solve the incentive problem of exploitative smugglers.
Let us normalize the total measure of the smugglers to 1, and each of them has the capacity of supplying 1 unit of border crossing services. That is, it can be hired by at most one worker. The total measure of the workers is m 1. All the agents are risk-neutral.
Let j 2 (0; 1) denote the given probability of apprehension at the border for j 2 fM; Sg where M denotes migrant and S smuggler. Let j 2 (0; 1) denote that of apprehension inland. We distinguish between and , for they usually di¤er from each other and j < j in many countries.
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It also becomes useful to distinguish between the probabilities for migrants and smugglers when we conduct comparative statics. We commonly observe M > S and M > S in the real world. Smugglers are often able to abandon their clients in order to evade capture. Also, for example, the driver might be apprehended at the border, but it is often di¢ cult to uncover the whole operation and organization.
[INSERT CHART: THE ORDER OF EVENTS]

Smugglers
We assume a smuggler's decision to exploit its client depends on its capacity to do so which determines the pro…tability of exploitation. Exploitation 22 See for instance Miller in Kyle and Koslowski (2001: Chapter 12) . 23 Aronowitz (2001: 169) notes forced prostitutes are likely to have more contacts with those other than tra¢ ckers than non-sexual forced laborers. In order to minimize the risk of apprehension, victims are often rotated geographically. Raviv and Andreani (2004) found human tra¢ cking operations have become increasingly invisible in the Balkan region. Criminal syndicates are likely to be well endowed with such facilities.
Smugglers exogenously di¤er in their capacities to exploit their smuggled clients in the destination. We de…ne exploitation as the use of labor without remuneration. Let k 2 [0; 1] denote the given capacity of a smuggler to exploit its migrated client's labor net of exploitation costs.
We suppose each worker is endowed with one unit of labor that can generate y > 0 in the destination. Therefore, if exploitation takes place, the smuggler's gain per migrant is ky while the client's earnings are reduced from
Let (k) be a distribution function, and (k) > 0 8 k 2 [0; 1] is the corresponding density function. Hence ( ) is nondegenerate.
Suppose a smuggling operation resulted in successful border crossing.
The migrant then paid a smuggling fee, f . The smuggler's expected pro…t from the post-smuggling exploitation is
where p > 0 represents the …xed penalty for smuggling and q > 0 the marginal penalty for exploitation in pecuniary terms. The expression assumes the fee payment by a client is seized and forfeited in the case of apprehension.
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Note, the …rst term indicates, when exploitation takes place, the smuggled migrant and the smuggler are always caught together with the apprehension probability of S . We thus assume k takes into account the capacity to reduce M to zero.
Let e (k) 2 f0; 1g be a binary variable that is 1 if a type-k smuggler decides to exploit its client and 0 if it does not. We assume a smuggler
Since the success of border crossing is uncertain at the pre-smuggling stage, a smuggler's total expected pro…t from smuggling is
where c > 0 denotes the sum of smuggling costs such as expenditures on transportation, hiding places, fraudulent documents and bribes. The …rst term implies a smuggler does not face a risk of apprehension inland if it decides not to exploit its client. 25 It also assumes a smuggler must deliver its client to the destination in order to receive the fee, f .
Let > 0 denote the alternative pro…t available for each smuggler, and we assume^ > is both necessary and su¢ cient for it to supply a border crossing service.
Workers
Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor which is supplied inelastically in either the home or the destination. 26 Let y > 0 denote the earnings per unit of labor in the destination.
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Let us normalize a worker's alternative income, ie, the earnings in the home, to zero. If apprehended, a worker is sent back to the home without paying a penalty. 28 If the apprehension takes place at the border, the worker need not pay a smuggling fee, either.
Suppose each smuggler's k is known to the workers. Suppose (1), (2) and (3) are also known to them. The expected utility of a successfully smuggled worker at the post-smuggling stage is
Note, when a migrant is exploited, S has to be taken into account because there is no chance to expect (1 M ) (1 k) y if the smuggler and the migrant are caught together during the exploitation process. We thus assume 26 We thus ignore the case where a worker supplies a fraction of the labor endowment in the home and the rest in the destination. 27 We ignore the possibility of smuggled migrants being unemployed in the destination because there appears to be high demand for illegal migrants who are usually willing to accept lower wages than natives. See OECD (2000: Chapter 3) for an overview. Pro…tability of hiring unauthorized migrants is exempli…ed by Ghosh (1998: 77) : the convicted employers of irregular migrants in the Netherlands in 1991 made a signi…cant …nancial gain even after paying for penalties and out-of-court settlements. Furthermore, Anderson and O'Connell Davidson (2003: 21, 25) found some features speci…c to migrants are preferred by consumers.
if exploitation takes place it does before a migrant can make use of any labor being unused by the smuggler.
At the pre-migration stage, a worker's expected total utility from hiring a smuggler is
which assumes the smuggling fee, f , is paid only if border crossing is successful. We suppose workers are not wealth-constrained in …nancing assisted clandestine migration.
We assumeû 0 is both necessary and su¢ cient for a worker to hire a smuggler. (5) implies the following participation constraint under symmetric complete information:
(1 e S ) (1 ek) y which needs to be met if a worker decides to hire a type-k smuggler.
Equilibrium
Under symmetric complete information, the workers know the exploitation capacity of each smuggler as well as its exploitation decision rule. Accordingly, (6) and m 1 imply there is a competitive equilibrium fee for each exploitation capacity, ie,
where f
(1 M ) y is the maximum fee that a worker is willing to pay for a non-exploitative smuggling service. By substituting (7) into (1) with e = 1, the exploitation condition,~ (f (k) ; k) > 0, can be rewritten as follows:
Therefore, we can rewrite the exploitation decision rule (2) as follows:
(2') e (k) = , ie, the denominator ofk is negative. Accordingly, we need y > S 1 S (p + q) to havek 2 (0; 1).
For those who cannot exploit smuggled migrants pro…tably, ie, k k , the participation constraint,^ (k k ) > , can be rewritten as
where f is the non-exploitative smuggler's shut-down fee at or below which it does not supply a smuggling service.
Exploitative smugglers with k >k may not participate in the market because (7) suggests, the more exploitative a smuggler, the lower the fee it can charge. Their participation constraint,^ (k >k) > , is equivalent to the following:
, no tra¢ cker enters the market. All the tra¢ ckers are active ifk < 0 or equivalently either (a) a combination of a negative numerator and a positive denominator in the expression fork, ie, f + S p < (1 S ) 2 f < (1 S ) y S q or (b) that of a positive numerator and a negative denominator, ie, f
In order to havek 2 (0; 1), we need either
The former implies both the denominator and the numerator ofk are positive, while both are negative for the latter. Note (1 S ) y S q > f + S p or equivalently y >
guaranteesk 2 (0; 1). Let us assume (11) holds throughout so as to examine the market withk;k 2 (0; 1).
holds.
In addition to restricting the threshold exploitation capacities,k andk, over the open interval (0; 1), this assumption implies the following.
Lemma 1 There exists a tra¢ cker who provides a border crossing service even without receiving a smuggling fee. is met by the …rst part of Assumption 1.
As we mentioned in Section 2, this is an important feature of the migrant smuggling market.
Note both threshold exploitation capacities,k andk, are exogenous, as shown in (8) and (10). The relationship betweenk andk is ambiguous without restrictions on the parameters in the expressions. We have the following three possible situations under Assumption 1.
Proposition 1
The market equilibrium is characterised as follows under symmetric complete information:
where is a constant greater than unity.
Proof. (7) and (9) imply all the non-exploitative smugglers participate in the market i¤ f > f . (8) and (10) suggest all the exploitative smugglers participate i¤k >k , f > f where
under Assumption 1. Whenk k , there are (k) (k) smugglers who can exploit migrants pro…tably but do not participate in the market, for the smuggling cost is too high, ie,^ (k >k)
In case (a), every smuggling agent supplies a border crossing service. In case (b), there are (k) (k) agents who can exploit their smuggled clients pro…tably, which negatively a¤ects the overall pro…t via a reduction in their fees under symmetric complete information so that they decide not to supply border crossing services. As a result, "modestly exploitative"smugglers, ie, k 2 (k;k], do not operate. Active smugglers are either non-exploitative, ie,
In case (c), not only "modestly exploitative" but also non-exploitative smugglers do not supply border crossing services. However, "highly exploitative"smugglers continue to operate, for they can pro…t from post-smuggling exploitation su¢ ciently enough to o¤set their low smuggling fees. Note, under symmetric complete information, any of these outcomes is Paretoe¢ cient, and each worker pays according to the observable exploitation capacity of each smuggler.
Asymmetric information
Let us now suppose the exploitation capacity of each smuggler is private information. Potential migrants are then unable to distinguish between the smugglers with di¤erent exploitation capacities. Accordingly, the smuggling fee is determined independently of the type of the smuggler whom a migrant hires. Because the workers are identical, every one of them forms the same expectation of exploitation in (7), ie, there is a single smuggling fee in the market. Let f be a function of the expected exploitation capacity denoted by . In the previous section, we saw the threshold exploitation capacities, k andk, were exogenously determined under symmetric information. In this section, we endogenize these in the expected exploitation via the smuggling fee, f ( ).
The exploitation condition,~ (f ( ) ; k) > 0, can be rewritten as
The exploitation decision of a smuggler thus depends on its k.
smugglers with higher exploitation capacities are more likely to decide to exploit their clients. This is the case under Assumption 1.
Those with k at whichf (k) f ( ) are non-exploitative and enter the market i¤ f ( ) > f , as shown in (9). That is, the participation decision of a non-exploitative smuggler does not depend on its own type.
Those with k at whichf (k) > f ( ) are exploitative and enter the market i¤^ (f ( ) ; k) > which can be rewritten as there is at least a tra¢ cker who is active but need not charge a fee.
Lemma 2 Non-exploitative smugglers cannot use a di¤erent fee to distinguish themselves from exploitative smugglers.
Proof. Assumption 1 suggests df =dk < 0 in (13), while the non-exploitative smuggler's shut-down fee is …xed at f in (9). There exists at least a tra¢ cker for whomf < f becausef < f , k > S ( f +p) (1 S )y S q 2 (0; 1) under Assumption 1, implying non-exploitative smugglers cannot use a lower-than-the-market fee for signalling. Since (1), (2) and (3) indicate d^ (~ > 0) =df > 0, neither can a higher-than-the-market price be used for signalling.
This suggests there always are exploitative smugglers who are willing to mimic any fee that non-exploitative smugglers might charge. Hence rational workers should ignore any fee signalling by non-exploitative smugglers.
Expressions (12) and (13) can be rewritten in a way analogous to (8) and (10) as follows:
Notice, whilek andk are exogenously given in (8) and (10) 
The …rst relationship and the …rst inequality in the second hold under Assumption 1. The second inequality in the second relationship also holds under the same assumption if f f . Hence we havek 0 ;k 0 2 (0; 1).
Also note that (14) and (15) imply
which leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The total number of active smuggling agents is non-decreasing in the fee, and the average exploitation is strictly decreasing in it.
Proof. (i) If f > f , (9) suggests all non-exploitative smugglers are active.
(16) suggests all tra¢ ckers are also active. Hence the number of active suppliers totals to measure one. If f f , all non-exploitative smugglers are inactive. There are 1 (k 0 ) active tra¢ ckers where (15) suggests 
The following table summarises the two possible situations:
Compared to the table in Proposition 1, there is no case where some tra¢ ckers are inactive while non-exploitative smugglers are active. Such a case was a possibility in the previous section because shut-down fees of "modestly exploitative"tra¢ ckers might be higher than non-exploitative smugglers'under symmetric information.
Let us now characterize the market equilibrium. The set of exploitation capacities of the smugglers who are willing to participate in the market at a given fee is
Since every worker believes the average exploitation capacity in the market is , (6) and m 1 suggest each smuggler can charge for a clandestine border crossing service
Note, as shown in the table after Lemma 3, there is no environment where only non-exploitative smugglers are active in the market. Therefore, > 0, and hence S is present in the expression.
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As in standard adverse selection models, we de…ne the equilibrium as the situation where the workers'expectation of the average exploitation capacity equals the actual average. 30 That is, we assume all the agents in the market know the distribution of the k parameter among the smugglers, and hence the workers'beliefs correctly re ‡ect the actual average exploitation capacity of the smugglers who are active in the market. Accordingly, = E [ekjk 2 K].
De…nition 1 Under asymmetric information, an equilibrium is characterized by a pair of a smuggling fee, f , and a set, K , of exploitation capacities being present in the market such that
29 For simplicity, we do not discount S by the ratio between tra¢ ckers and smugglers. 30 See for instance Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995: 439) . wherek k 0 (f ) and, withk k 0 (f ),
Proposition 2 Under asymmetric information, if f f , the market equilibrium is characterized by adverse selection: only tra¢ ckers are active even though each worker is willing to pay f > f to a non-exploitative smuggler.
Proof. (9) implies all non-exploitative smugglers are inactive i¤ f f .
(16) and (15) Thus, in this market for migrant smuggling, the equilibrium might be of adverse selection …rst characterized by Akerlof (1970) : all non-exploitative smugglers are driven out of the market while migrants are willing to pay a high fee to hire such a supplier.
The equilibrium is not necessarily unique, as in Wilson (1980) . The multiplicity depends on (k). Rose (1993) argued multiple equilibria are rare possibilities in this type of adverse selection model. Hence let us assume that the capacity distribution gives a unique equilibrium. We now examine how policy instruments would a¤ect the number of active smugglers and the average exploitation in equilibrium.
Policy implication
Using this model, let us now examine ceteris paribus e¤ects of anti-illegal migration measures on the market equilibrium. There are two equilibrium situations: f > f and f f . In the former case, all smugglers are active, while all non-exploitative smugglers are absent in the latter. The following proposition is for the full participation equilibrium before a policy change.
Proposition 3 When all smugglers are active in initial equilibrium, ie, f > f , we have the following:
(i) Improved border apprehension, either M or S , does not directly a¤ect the average exploitation by a¤ecting exploitation decision making. However, it may drive away all non-exploitative smugglers from the market by raising their shut-down fee.
(ii) An increase in the penalty for migrant smuggling, p, decreases the average exploitation. It increases both non-exploitative smugglers'shut-down fee and the equilibrium fee, and hence it is ambiguous whether it tends to drive away all non-exploitative smugglers from the market.
(iii) An increase in the marginal penalty for exploitation, q, decreases the average exploitation. It also maintains the full participation by increasing the equilibrium fee.
(iv) Improved inland apprehension of smuggled migrants, M , increases the average exploitation. It may drive away all non-exploitative smugglers from the market by reducing the equilibrium fee.
(v) Improved inland apprehension of exploitative smugglers, S , increases the average exploitation if S remains su¢ ciently small:
> S in particular. If this condition is met, it may drive away all nonexploitative smugglers from the market by reducing the equilibrium fee. (If this condition is not met, the average exploitation is non-increasing in it, and its e¤ect on the equilibrium fee is ambiguous.)
Proof. See Appendix 2.
The intuition behind Part (i) of the proposition is that border control does not directly a¤ect the exploitation decision making because exploitation takes place after border crossing. That is, the decision is made, assuming successful border crossing. However, it raises the shut-down fee for non-exploitative smugglers in (9). This also a¤ects the shut-down fees for exploitative smugglers in (13). This increase is to compensate an increased risk of apprehension at the border. As (16) implies, the least capable of exploitation will exit the market …rst.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of the proposition result from the fact that these measures negatively in ‡uence the pro…tability of migrant exploitation via (1), and an increase in these implies a smaller number of smugglers to become exploitative. The marginal penalty for exploitation does not a¤ect the profitability of smuggling, as far as the smuggler decides not to exploit its customer. Hence the full participation is maintained. However, the penalty for smuggling negatively a¤ects both the pro…tability of exploitation and smuggling, as (1) and (3) imply. As a result, its e¤ect on the number of active smugglers remains ambiguous.
The intuition behind Part (iv) of the proposition is that a high probabil-ity of catching smuggled migrants reduces each worker's expected gain from migration. This will be re ‡ected in the equilibrium fee in (17). A fall in f then lowersk , which increases the average exploitation by increasing the ratio of exploitative to non-exploitative smugglers. Lemma 2 indicates that the higher the exploitation capacity, the lower the shut-down fee. Hence suf…ciently high M will drive away non-exploitative smugglers from the market.
Part (v) of the proposition suggests that the e¤ect of improved inland apprehension of exploitative smuggers is similar to that of improved inland apprehension of smuggled migrants, as far as the apprehension rate remains low. If S exceeds a certain level given in the proposition as a result of improved apprehension e¤ort, the average exploitation decreases becausek would then be increased. Its e¤ect on the equilibrium fee then becomes ambiguous, and hence it is not clear whether the full participation is maintained.
Compared to this full participation case, we have a simple, unambiguous result when the initial equilibrium is characterized by adverse selection, ie, the absence of non-exploitative smugglers.
Proposition 4 When all non-exploitative smugglers exit the market in initial equilibrium, ie, f f , the number of active exploitative smugglers is decreasing in any of the anti-smuggling measures, while the average exploitation in the market is increasing in it.
The implication is that, under adverse selection, policymakers face a dilemma of whether to reduce the average exploitation that each smuggled migrant su¤ers from or the availability of smuggling services to potential migrants.
Conclusion
This paper formalized the migrant smuggling market in which migrants face a risk of being exploited after successful border crossing. Our model is a variant of Akerlof's (1970) lemons framework.
The comparative statics analysis provided us with policy implications by linking the …ght against illegal migration with the risk of exploitation that migrants face when using smuggling services.
We found that, in the market where all migrants are more or less exploited by smuggling agents (Proposition 4), policies that reduce the number of active smuggling agents inevitably raise the average exploitation. Policymakers are thus likely to face a dilemma of whether to minimize the mean exploitation of tra¢ cked migrants or to reduce the availability of smuggling services. Accordingly, if exploitation is becoming severer than before, it might be a byproduct of a successful reduction in the number of smuggling activities overall.
We also found that, in the market where there are some unexploited migrants (Proposition 3), unlike the adverse selection case, di¤erent policy instruments do not have the same e¤ect on the average exploitation and the number of active smugglers.
A severe marginal penalty for labor exploitation (Part iii) is a policy choice for those who are concerned with the welfare of smuggled migrants because it reduces the average exploitation. Regardless of how severe it is, an increase in the marginal penalty avoids the exit of all non-exploitative smugglers that results in a sudden increase in the average exploitation.
A large penalty for migrant smuggling (Part ii) also reduces the average exploitation. However, it raises both non-exploitative smugglers'shut-down fee and the equilibrium fee, and it remains ambiguous whether a large penalty for smuggling can avoid a sudden increase in the average exploitation due to the exit of all non-exploitative smugglers.
An improvement in border control (Parts i and ii) is not recommended because, while it has no e¤ect on the average exploitation as far as the equilibrium fee is higher than non-exploitative smugglers'shut-down fee, it raises the latter by increasing the risk of conducting the illicit business. Improved border apprehension then indicates the market moves to the adverse selection state.
Improved inland apprehension of smuggled migrants (Part iv) is not a choice either if the welfare of smuggled migrants is important, while our result leaves ambiguity as to the e¤ect of improve inland apprehension of exploitative smugglers on the mean exploitation and the number of active smugglers (Part v).
If a su¢ cient resource is available under this initially non-adverse selection equilibrium, inland apprehension of smuggled migrants ( M ) and border apprehension ( M and S ) can be used to …rst push the market to the adverse selection state, and then any instrument may be used to reduce the number of active smugglers to zero. However, such a su¢ cient resource is unlikely to be available.
Policymakers may also note the con ‡icting e¤ects among the instruments.
For instance, a combination of a large marginal penalty for exploitation (q) and a high probability of apprehending smuggled migrants inland ( M ) would imply that one e¤ect is likely to o¤set the other. As a result, neither of the instruments may appear e¤ective ex post.
The reliability of the results in this paper is limited in several aspects.
One concern is that the model assumes an exogenous distribution of the exploitation capacity among potential suppliers of smuggling services. However, it is perceivable that this capacity would respond to the pro…tability of exploitation. Extending the model by endogenizing exploitation capacity building may change the results and is left for a future study.
Another future research topic in this area is to see the equilibrium in a dynamic setting. Descriptive evidence suggests that potential migrants often make use of social networks in their search for reliable smugglers. On the other hand, it also suggests that tra¢ ckers are cunning and are able to …nd victims. A study that examines an equilibrium path with information transmission over time is suggested. Let us rearrangek (p; q; M ; S ) in (14) as follows:
By applying the implicit function theorem to F 1 , we obtain the following derivatives:
where @F 1 =@k = (1 S ) y
which is the case under Assumption 1. Hence dk =dp > 0, dk =dq > 0 and dk =d M < 0. The sign of dk =d S is determined by the numerator. dk =d S > 0 if (y + q)k + p + (1 2 S ) (1 M ) y (1 ) > 0 or
Let us rearrangek (p; q; M ; S ; M ; S ) in (15) as follows:
By applying the implicit function theorem to F 2 , we obtain the following derivatives: dk dp
where @F 2 =@k = (1 S ) y We now turn to the number of active smugglers in the market. As (16) and Lemma 3 indicate, it is dependent on the gap between the market fee and the shut-down fee for non-exploitative suppliers. Let D ( M ; S ; p; q; M ; S ) f f
.
Lemma 3 implies the full participation when D > 0. The relevant threshold capacity isk . We have
< 0 dD dp = (1 S ) (1 M ) y d dk dk dp
When D 0, the relevant threshold capacity isk . We then have all the six derivatives negative.
